Taleb The Black Swan 2nd Ed., 2010 (orig. 2007?) p. xxvii [Prologue, subheading "A New Kind of Ingratitude"--"The [hypothetical] person who imposed locks on cockpit doors [the day before 9/11] gets no statues in public squares, not so much as a quick mention of his contribution in his obituary. ... Seeing how superfluous his measure was, and how it squandered resources, the public, with great help from airline pilots, might well boot him out of office. ... [xxviii] I wish I could go attend his funeral, but, reader, I can't find him. And yet, recognition can be quite a pump. Believe me, even those who genuinely claim that they do not believe in recognition, and that they separate labor from the fruits of labor, actually get a serotonin kick from it. See how the silent hero is rewarded: even his own hormonal system will conspire to offer no reward. ... [xxviii]"everyone knows that you need more prevention than treatment, but few reward acts of prevention." p. 30--"what was so unjust about the spread of books? The alphabet allowed stories and ideas to be replicated with high fidelity and without limit, without any additional expenditure of energy on the author's part for the subsequent performances. He didn't even have to be alive for them—death is often a good career move for an author. This implies that those who, for some reason, start getting some attention can quickly reach more minds than others and displace the competitors from the bookshelves. In the days of bards and troubadours, everyone had an audience. A storyteller, like a baker or a coppersmith, had a market, and the assurance that none from far away could dislodge him from his territory. Today, a few take almost everything; the rest, next to nothing." This is a bit too cute. NNT has omitted the question of freedom of vocational choice, for which the winner-take-all situation in the contemporary arts is something of a tradeoff; and by saying that the troubadour had a "market" he risks ascibing a modern instituion to an era in which it did not yet exist (at least not in modern form). Even so, the serotonin angle is well-taken. It would indeed seem possible to elide this unhappy scenario by letting go of the personal investment in success, recognition, sales, etc...but I think he is right to question whether that is really possible to do (or, perhaps it is possible and valid but still it does not win happiness or contentment for the spurned artist, just a different flavor of grief).
p. 56 [subheading "Negative Empiricism"]--"I am saying that a series of corroborative facts is not necessarily evidence. Seeing white swans does not confirm the nonexistence of black swans. There is an exception, however: I know what statement is wrong, but not necessarily what statement is correct. If I see a black swan I can certify that all swans are not white! ...
"We can get closer to the truth by negative instances, not by verification. It is misleading to build a general rule from observed facts. Contrary to conventional wisdom, our body of knowledge does not increase from a series of confirmatory observations, like the turkey's. But there are some things I can remain skeptical about, and others I can safely consider certain. This makes the consequences of observations one-sided. It is not much more difficult than that.
"This asymmetry is immensely practical. It tells us that we do not have to be complete skeptics, just semiskeptics. The subtelty of real life over the books is that, in your decision making, you need be interested only in one side of the story: if you seek certainty about whether the patient has cancer, not certainty about whether he is healthy, then you might be satisfied with negative inference, since it will supply you the certainty you seek. So [57] we can learn a lot from data—but not as much as we expect. Sometimes a lot of data can be meaningless; at other times one single piece of information can be very meaningful. It is true that a thousand days cannot prove you right, but one day can prove you to be wrong." [subsequently remarks that Popper is credited with this, though there were others too]
***the connection to scale*** p. 61-"the sources of Black Swans today have multiplied beyond measurability.* In the primitive environment they were limited to newly encountered wild animals, new enemies, and abrupt weather changes. These events were repeatable enough for us to have built an innate fear of them. This instinct to make inferences rather quickly, and to "tunnel"...remains rather ingrained in us. This instinct, in a word, is our predicament." "[the footnote]*Clearly, weather-related and geodesic events (such as tornadoes and earthquakes) have not changed much over the past millennium, but what have changed are the socioeconomic consequences of such occurrences. Today, an earthquake or hurricane commands more and more severe economic consequences than it did in the past because of interlocking relationships between economic entities and the intensification of the "network effects" that we will discuss in Part Three. ..." So, pick all the nits you want with this familiarly reductionist presentation of the primal world; the point, which stands regardless, is that the severity and senselssness of "our predicament" varies directly with the growth of "interlocking relationships." p. 67 [subheading "A Little More Dopamine"]--"In addition to the story of the left-brain interpreter, we have more physiological evidence of our ingrained pattern seeking, thanks to our growing knowledge of the role of neurotransmitters, the chemicals that are assumed to transport signals between different parts of the brain. It appears that pattern perception increases along with the concentration in the brain of the chemical dopamine. Dopamine also regulates moods and supplies an internal reward system in the brain (not surprisingly, it is found in slightly higher concentrations in the left side of the brains of right-handed people than on the right side). A higher concentration of dopamine appears to lower skepticism and result in greater vulnerability to pattern detection; an injection of L-dopa, a substance used to treat patients with Parkinson's disease, seems to increase such activity and lowers one's suspension of belief. The person becomes vulnerable to all manner of fads, such as astrology, superstitions, economics, and tarot-card reading. "Actually, as I am writing this, there is news of a pending lawsuit by a patient going after his doctor for more than $200,000—an amount he allegedly lost while gambling. The patient claims that the treatment of his Parkinson's disease caused him to go on wild betting sprees in casinos. It turns out that one of the side effects of L-dopa is that a small but significant minority of patients become compulsive gamblers. Since such gambling is associated with their seeing what they believe to be clear patterns in random numbers, this illustrates the relation between knowledge and randomness. It also shows that some aspects of what we call "knowledge" (and what I call narrative) are an ailment. "Once again, I warn the reader that I am not focusing on dopamine as the reason for our overinterpreting; rather, my point is that there is a physical and neural correlate to such operation and that our minds are largely victims of our physical embodiment. Our minds are like inmates, captive to our biology, unless we manage a cunning escape. It is the lack of our control of such inferences that I am stressing. Tomorrow, someone may [68] discover another chemical or organic basis for our perception of patterns, or counter what I said about the left-brain interpreter by showing the role of a more complex structure; but it would not negate the idea that perception of causation has a biological foundation." p. 90--"Even economically, the individual Black Swan hunters are not the ones who make the bucks. The researcher Thomas Astebro has shown that returns on independent inventions (you take the cemetery into account) are far lower than those on venture capital. Some blindness to the odds or an obsession with their own positive Black Swan is necessary for entrepreneurs to function. The venture capitalist is the one who gets the shekels. The economist William Baumol calls this "a touch of madness." This may indeed apply to all concentrated businesses: when you look at the empirical record, you not only see that venture capitalists do better than entrepreneurs, but publishers do better than writers, dealers do better than artists, and science does better than scientists (about 50 percent of scientific and scholarly papers, costing months, sometimes years, of effort, are never truly read). The person involved in such gambles is paid in a currency other than material success: hope." The point about gatekeepers reaping greater material rewards than producers is crucial. But for god's sake, can we decouple it from the econ 101 theory of cultural production? Besides "hope," mustn't something like fulfillment be at play? ***related to Peak*** p. 94--"It may be a banality that we need others for many things, but we need them far more than we realize, particularly for dignity and respect. Indeed, we have very few historical records of people who have achieved anything extraordinary without such peer validation—but we have the freedom to choose our peers. If we look at the history of ideas, we see schools of thought occasionally forming, producing unusual work unpopular outside the school. You hear about the Stoics, the Academic Skeptics, the Cynics, the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, the Essenes, the Surrealists, the Dadaists, the anarchists, the hippies, the fundamentalists. A school allows someone with unusual ideas with the remote possibility of a payoff to find company and create a microcosm insulated from others. The members of the group can be ostracized together—which is better than being ostracized alone. "If you engage in a Black Swan-dependent activity, it is better to be part of a group." ***relates to Rank*** p. 105--"Numerous studies of millionaires aimed at figuring out the skills required for hotshotness follow the following methodology. They take a population of hotshots, those with big titles and big jobs, and study their attributes. ... "Now take a look at the cemetery. It is quite difficult to do so because people who fail do not seem to write memoirs, and, if they did, those business publishers I know would not even consider giving them the courtesy of a returned phone call... Readers would not pay $26.95 for a story of failure, even if you convinced them that it had more useful tricks than a story of success. The entire notion of biography is grounded in the arbitrary ascription of a causal relation between specified traits and subsequent events. Now consider the cemetery. The graveyard of failed persons will be full of people who shared the following traits: courage, risk taking, optimism, etc. Just like the population of millionaires. There may be some difference in skills, but [106] what truly separates the two is for the most part a single factor: luck. Plain luck." p. 117--"evolutionary fitness is something that is continuously touted an aggrandized by the crowd who takes it as gospel. The more unfamiliar someone is with the wild Black Swan-generating randomness, the more he or she believes in the optimal working of evolution. Silent evidence is not present in their theories. Evolution is a series of flukes, some good, many bad. You only see the good. But, in the short term, it is not obvious which traits are really good for you, particularly if you are in the Black Swan-generating environment of Extremistan. This is like looking at rich gamblers coming out of the casino and claiming that a taste for gambling is good for the species because gambling makes you rich! Risk taking made many species head for extinction. "This idea that we are here, that this is the best of all possible worlds, and that evolution did a great job seems rather bogus in the light of the silent-evidence effect. The fools, the Casanovas, and the blind risk takers are often the ones who win in the short term. Worse, in a Black Swan environment, where one single but rare event can come shake up a species after a very long run of "fitness," the foolish risk takers can also win in the long term!" p. 120--"My biggest problem with the educational system lies precisely in that it forces students to squeeze explanations out of subject matters and shames them for withholding judgment, for uttering the "I don't know." Why did the Cold War end? Why did the Persians lose the battle of Salamis? Why did Hannibal get his behind kicked? Why did Casanova bounce back from hardship? In each of these examples, we are taking a condition, survival, and looking for the explanations, instead of flipping the argument on its head and stating that conditional on such survival, one cannot read that much into the process, and should learn instead to invoke some measure of randomness (randomness, in practice, is what we don't know; to invoke randomness is to plead ignorance). It is not just your college professor who gives you bad habits. I showed in Chapter 6 how newspapers need to stuff their texts with causal links to make you enjoy the narratives. But have the integrity to deliver your "because" very sparingly; try to limit it to situations where the "because" is derived from experiments, not backward-looking history. "Note here that I am not saying causes do not exist; do not use this argument to avoid trying to learn from history. All I am saying is that it is [121] not so simple; be suspicious of the "because" and handle it with care—particularly in situations where you suspect silent evidence." p. 144--"Show two groups of people a blurry image of a fire hydrant, blurry enough for them not to recognize what it is. For one group, increase the resolution slowly, in ten steps. For the second, do it faster, in five steps. Stop at a point where both groups have been presented an identical image and ask each of them to identify what they see. The members of the group that saw fewer intermediate steps are likely to recognize the hydrant much faster. Moral? The more information you give someone, the more hypotheses they will form along the way, and the worse off they will be. They see more random noise and mistake it for information." p. 196--"If you have the right models...you can predict with great precision how the ice cube will melt—this is a specific engineering problem devoid of complexity, easier than the one involving billiard balls. However, from the pool of water you can build infinite possible ice cubes, if there was in fact an ice cube there at all. The first direction, from the ice cube to the puddle, is called the forward process. The second direction, the backward process, is much, much more complicated. The forward process is generally used in physics and engineering; the backward process in nonrepeatable, nonexperimental historical approaches. "In a way, the limitations that prevent us from unfrying an egg also prevent us from reverse engineering history." p. 202--against a statement of B. Russell's that people can/must be trained to withhold judgment: "We cannot teach people to withhold judgment; judgments are embedded in the way we view objects. ... It is not possible without great, paralyzing effort to strip these small values we attach to matters. Likewise, it is not possible to hold a situation in one's head without some element of bias. Something in our dear human nature makes us want to believe; so what? "Philosophers since Aristotle have taught us that we are deep-thinking animals, and that we can learn by reasoning. It took a while to discover that we do effectively think, but that we more readily narrate backward in order to give ourselves the illusion of understanding, and give a cover to our past actions. The minute we forgot about this point, the "Enlightenment" came to drill it into our heads for a second time. "I'd rather degrade us humans to a level certainly above other known animals but not quite on par with the ideal Olympian man who can absorb philosophical statements and act accordingly. Indeed, if philosophy were that effective, the self-help section of the local bookstore would be of some use in consoling souls experiencing pain—but it isn't. We forget to philosophize when under strain." p. 203--"The lesson for the small [matters] is: be human! Accept that being human involves some amount of epistemic arrogance in running your affairs. Do not be ashamed of that. Do not try to always withhold judgment—opinions are the stuff of life. Do not try to avoid predicting—yes, after all this diatribe about prediction I am not urging you to stop being a fool. Just be a fool in the right places. "What you should avoid is unnecessary dependence on large-scale harmful predictions—those and only those. Avoid the big subjects that may hurt your future: be fooled in small matters, not in the large. Do not listen to economic forecasters or to predictors in social science (they are mere entertainers), but do make your own forecast for the picnic. By all means, demand certainty for the next picnic; but avoid government social-security forecasts for the year 2040. "Know how to rank beliefs not according to their plausibility but by the harm they may cause." ***city living*** p. 208--"[Opportunities] are rare, much rarer than you think. Remember that positive Black Swans have a necessary first step: you need to be exposed to them. ... [209] Collect as many free nonlottery tickets (those with open-ended payoffs) as you can, and, once they start paying off, do not discard them. Work hard, not in grunt work, but in chasing such opportunities and maximizing exposure to them. This makes living in big cities invaluable because you increase the odds of serendipitous encounters—you gain exposure to the envelope of serendipity. The idea of settling in a rural area on the grounds that one has good communications "in the age of the Internet" tunnels out of such sources of positive uncertainty." p. 220--"Ideas do not spread without some form of structure. ... Just as we tend to generalize some matters but not others, so there seem to be "basins of attraction" directing us to certain beliefs. Some ideas will prove contagious, but not others; some forms of superstitions will spread, but not others; some types of religious beliefs will dominate, but not others. The anthropologist, cognitive scientist, and philosopher Dan Sperber has proposed the following idea on the epidemiology of representations. What people call "memes," ideas that spread and that compete with one another using people as carriers, are not truly like genes. Ideas spread because, alas, they have for carriers self-serving agents who are interested in them, and interested in distorting them in the replication process. You do not make a cake for the sake of merely replicating a recipe—you try to make your own cake, using ideas from others to improve it. We humans are not photocopiers. So contagious mental categories must be those in which we are prepared to believe, perhaps even programmed to believe. To be contagious, a category must agree with our nature." p. 227--"Fairness is not exclusively an economic matter; it becomes less and less so when we are satisfying our basic material needs. It is pecking order that matters! The superstars will always be there. The Soviets may have flattened the economic structure, but they encouraged their own brand of übermensch. What is poorly understood, or denied (owing to its unsettling implications) is the absence of a role for the average in intellectual production. The dispropotionate share of the very few in intellectual influence is even more unsettling than the unequal distribution of wealth—unsettling because, like the income gap, no social policy can eliminate it. Communism could conceal or compress income discrepancies, but it could not eliminate the superstar system in intellectual life." [goes on to cite Michael Marmot study finding that "those at the top of the pecking order live longer" (228)] p. 256--Mandelbrot: "I had to invent my predecessors, so people take me seriously" p. 269--"The problem of the circularity of statistics (which we can also call the statistical regress argument) is as follows. Say you need past data to discover whether a probability distribution is Gaussian, fractal, or something else. You will need to establish whether you have enough data to back up your claim. How do we know if we have enough data? From the probability distribution—a distribution does tell you whether you have enough data to "build confidence" about what you are inferring. If it is a Gaussian bell curve, then a few points will suffice (the law of large numbers once again). And how do you know if the distribution is Gaussian? Well, from the data. So we need the data to tell us what the probability distribution is, and a probability distribution to tell us how much data we need. This causes a severe regress argument. ... "Now, why aren't statisticians who work with historical data aware of this problem? First, they do not like to hear that their entire business has been canceled by the problem of induction. Second, they are not confronted with the results of their predictions in rigorous ways." Again, a facile but meaningful recapitulation of one of Ericsson's pillars of deliberate practice: feedback. Without feedback (and deliberate response to it), one cannot actually get better at something. p. 275--"The strangest thing is that people in business usually agree with me when they listen to me talk or hear me state my case. But when they go to the office the next day they revert to the Gaussian tools so entrenched in their habits. Their minds are domain-dependent, so they can exercise critical thinking at a conference while not doing so in the office." ***scale*** p. 314--"Mother Nature does not like anything too big. The largest land animal is the elephant, and there is a reason for that. If I went on a rampage and shot an elephant, I might be put in jail, and get yelled at by my mother, but I would hardly disturb the ecology of Mother Nature. On the other hand, my point about banks in Chapter 14—that if you shot a large bank, I would "shiver at the consequences" and that "if one falls they all fall"—was subsequently illustrated by events... Mother Nature does not limit the interactions between entities; it just limits the size of its units. (Hence my idea is not to stop globalization and ban the Internet; as we will see, much more stability would be achieved by stopping governments from helping companies when they become large and by giving back advantages to the small guy.) "But there is another reason for man-made structures not to get too large. The notion of "economies of scale"—that companies save money when they become large, hence more efficient—is often, apparently behind company expansions and mergers. It is prevalent in the collective consciousness without evidence for it; in fact the evidence would suggest the opposite. Yet, for obvious reasons, people keep doing these mergers—they are not good for companies, they are good for Wall Street bonuses... ...as they become larger, companies appear to be more "efficient," but they are also more vulnerable to outside contingencies... [315] All that under the illusion of more stability. Add the fact that when companies are large, they need to optimize so as to satisfy Wall Street analysts...[who] will pressure companies to sell the extra kidney and ditch insurance to raise their "earnings per share" and "improve their bottom line"—hence eventually contributing to their bankruptcy. "Charles Tapeiro and I have shown mathematically that a certain class of unforeseen errors and random shocks hurts large organisms vastly more than smaller ones. ... "The problem with governments is that they will tend to support these fragile organisms "because they are large employers" and because they have lobbyists... Large companies get government support and become progressively larger and more fragile, and, in a way, run government, another prophetic view of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Hairdressers and small businesses on the other hand, fail without anyone caring about them; they need to be efficient and to obey the laws of nature." p. 352--"Let me provide once again an illustration of Extremistan. Less than 0.25 percent of all the companies listed in the world represent around half of the market capitalization, a less than miniscule percentage of novels on the planet accounts for approximately half of fiction sales, less than 0.1 percent of drugs generate a little more than half of the pharmaceutical industry's sales—and less than 0.1 percent of risky events will cause at least half the damage and losses." p. 368--"Positive advice is usually the province of the charlatan. Bookstores are full of books on how someone became successful; there are almost no books with the title What I Learned Going Bust, or Ten Mistakes to Avoid in Life. "Linked to this need for positive advice is the preference we have to do something rather than nothing, even in cases where doing something is harmful." p. 392 [endnotes]--"Note that the works of Gary Becker and the Platonists of the Chicago School are all marred by the confirmation bias: Becker is quick to show you situations in which people are moved by economic incentives, but does not show you cases (vastly more numerous) in which people don't care about such materialistic incentives."